By G. E. M. Anscombe
Initially released in 1959. Anscombe, analytic thinker and editor of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, offers a consultant in the course of the Tractatus. It presents context for Wittgenstein via addressing the questions and advancements of analytic philosophy.
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Extra info for Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (2nd Edition)
If we cannot, then 'A' is a proper name; if we can, it is not. g. 'Some committee' or 'Any for institution'. For these cases the point is readily seen (cf. Chapter 1, THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS 47 4 But where A' is a definite description, the distinction between the internal and external negation still holds. The question whether there must be simple signs in Russell's sense thus leads us on to the question whether there must be substitutions in 'x is corrupt' for which there is no distinction between internal and external negation.
Now suppose that we have a proposition 'A is corrupt'. *A' appears in the argument place in the function 'x is corrupt'. e. between taking this as the negation of the result of substituting 'A* V in *x is corrupt' (external negation), and taking it as the result of substituting 'A' for *x' in *x is not corrupt' (internal negation)? If we cannot, then 'A' is a proper name; if we can, it is not. g. 'Some committee' or 'Any for institution'. For these cases the point is readily seen (cf. Chapter 1, THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS 47 4 But where A' is a definite description, the distinction between the internal and external negation still holds.
But in this case Wittgenstein, following Frege, would say that there was absolutely no difference of sense. Now it seems plausible to say that the reason why we have an ambiguity resoluble by brackets in the one case but not in the other which 1 asserts See Chapter 11, pp. 138-41. 40 is AN INTRODUCTION TO WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS that, at any rate as compared with 'Every man' and 'some girl', the expressions 'Socrates* and 'Plato' are simple. This sort of consideration may lead us to divine behind our propositions a kind of proposition to which the chemical analogy of radicals will apply perfectly; unlike a proposition in which, though you have the same expressions combined in the same way, it makes a difference by what stages you conceive the proposition as built up.